Europe's separatists

Mar 1st 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Scots, Catalans, the Flemish and others put their faith in polls

This year promises to be a defining moment for regional independence movements in the EU. The pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) is riding high in opinion polls in the run-up [the run-up to something  the period of time just before an important event ] to Scottish parliament elections being held on May 3rd. The following month, Belgians vote in a general election in which the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang—which wants full independence from Francophone Belgians—has nearly 25% of the Flemish vote according to polls. A devolution deal for Catalonia is being challenged by Spain's opposition party, which if successful may trigger a backlash in favour of independence for the region; and attempts by the Madrid government to find a peaceful settlement with Batasuna, the political wing of Basque separatist group ETA, have broken down. Separatist pressure in Spain is likely to continue. However, all of these—and other such movements in Europe—have distinct economic, cultural or historical roots, making it difficult to discern where the impetus for regional independence is coming from, and therefore their likelihood of success.

Contradictions and inconsistencies

The existence of ethnic or linguistic differences within EU member states, in itself, provides little indication of a desire for further devolution. Federalism already works well, for example, in Switzerland, whose ethnic German, French and Italians voters support parties on ideological rather than ethnic grounds. Despite some prickliness [来自 PRICK 刺   informal someone who is prickly gets annoyed or offended easily ], Hungarian minorities have been absorbed well into the political mainstream in both Romania and Slovakia (though they continue to vote for their own parties), and Russian minorities in the Baltics have never been keen to break away. Wales, which has its own language, shows far less interest in independence than English-speaking Scotland. And although Spain's Basques may view their distinct language and culture as a good reason for independence, this view appears not to be as strongly held by Basques in France.

Yet attempts by central governments to placate independence movements by granting sometimes extensive autonomy to regionally-self contained [complete and not needing other things or help from somewhere else to work] minority groups, or by increasing their representation at national level, have not always been successful. Indeed, in some cases, the process may have fuelled further demands. Broad autonomy for Spain's Basque region appears not to have dented [if you dent something, or if it dents, you hit or press it so that its surface is bent inwards 引申为 HARM] support for independence there, although the population's backing for a strategy of violence has diminished markedly since 2004.

The motivations behind the recent rise in Scottish separatism are no clearer. In the 1970s, the debate about Scottish devolution[when a national government gives power to a group or organization at a lower or more local level] was framed[formal to organize and develop a plan, system etc ] by the so-called "West Lothian question" which pointed to[to mention something because you think it is important] the fact that Scottish MPs in London could vote on English issues, but English MPs might have no say on Scottish issues. During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, when the Conservative party dominated politics in London, the fact that there was very little Scottish support for the Conservatives in Scotland heightened a sense among Scots that they were being ruled by a foreign government. This mood was expected to recede when the Labour party came to power in 1997, boasting a disproportionate number of Scottish MPs and senior cabinet ministers. The government also passed legislation devolving powers to a new Scottish parliament in 1999. Yet none of this has diminished the appetite in Scotland for independence.

Similarly, Flanders already enjoys considerable autonomy in Belgium, but the constitution is nevertheless likely to be changed after the June election to allow still further devolution. Basques are all but independent in Spain, save for setting their own corporate tax rates and foreign policy.

Conversely, France has successfully resisted moves—some violent—by Bretons and Corsicans for autonomy, and these movements have floundered [to be unable to move easily because you are in deep water or mud, or cannot see very well   to have a lot of problems and be likely to fail completely  ].

However, Italy's Northern League—which claims to have little cultural affinity [a close relationship between two things because of qualities or features that they share ] with southern Italy—shelved its campaign for independence after joining Silvio Berlusconi's right of centre coalition which came to power in 2001-06.

Left v right, rich v poor

The political hue[a type of opinion, belief etc] of either the regional movements themselves or the central authorities provides few clues as to  [concerning ] possible future arrangements. Belgium's Vlaams Belang holds extreme right wing positions on many political issues. But other Flemish parties, ranging from Socialist to Liberal, also want to stretch their autonomy as far as possible short of [short of (doing) something  without actually doing something ] outright [2  complete and total ] independence. Italy's Northern League is firmly on the right; Basque separatists are on the far left, reflecting in part [in part  to some degree, but not completely] their anti-Franco history; while the SNP is viewed as a centre left party.

Perhaps the more pertinent[directly relating to something that is being considered] distinction is whether the seceding regions are the weaker or stronger party, economically, within their respective federal systems. Arguably, poorer entities will tend not to want to secede from richer states, though richer regions--or those with natural resources to grab [▶GET SOMETHING FOR YOURSELF◀ to get something for yourself, sometimes in an unfair way ]--may feel the opposite way. The Flemish population is the stronger economic force in Belgium, and views its ties with the francophone Walloons as a brake on[to make something develop more slowly, be more difficult to do, or happen less ] its own development. The Northern League in Italy had been seeking to leave a poorer South. In Spain too, Catalans and Basques earn far more than the national average. And Czechs seemed happy to see poorer Slovakia go its own way in 1993. In Scotland, income per head is below that in England, though some Scottish nationalists have in the past hoped to even[if things even out, or if you even them out, the differences between them become smaller]the score by taking over the UK's rapidly depleting North Sea gas reserves. A sense of economic well-being may also stem from the fact that the central government spends far more per head in Scotland than in England. It is also worth noting [it's worth noting that... 值得注意的是] that support for Scottish independence is increasingly coming from wealthier constituencies in England, happy to end what they view as excessive subsidies from central government.

Populism [relating to or representing ordinary people, rather than rich or very highly educated people ] and the EU

For the moment, there are two key factors acting against a major breakthrough for regional independence movements in Europe. Most importantly, they do not command majority support from their own populations. Most voters in such regions still prefer to remain within a common state, albeit with varying degrees of autonomy. Scots voters may give the SNP a major[American English spoken very important ] boost in the upcoming local assembly [a group of people who are elected to make decisions or laws for a particular country, area, or organization ] elections, but any subsequent referendum on independence is likely to fail. In Belgium, where support in Flanders for independence goes beyond the politically-tainted Vlaams Belang party, the majority want to remain in Belgium, if only [if onlya) used to express a strong wish, especially when you know that what you want cannot happen ] to hold onto their prized[extremely important or valuable to someone ] capital Brussels which lies in the French speaking part of the country. And although a sizeable minority of Basques support a non-violent path to independence, a majority of those living in Basque territory—many of whom are not Basque—prefer to remain as part of a loose federation within Spain. Were they to achieve full independence, this would create yet another unhappy minority.

The EU is also unlikely to support moves leading to any disintegration of member states. Regional movements often point to[▶FACE IN ONE DIRECTION◀[intransitive always + adverb/preposition] to face or be aimed in a particular direction ] the EU as a trans-national safeguard [a rule, agreement etc that is intended to protect someone or something from possible dangers or problems ], allowing them more easily to dispense[dispense with something phrasal verb  to not use or do something that people usually use or do, because it is not necessary] with their nation-state affiliation. But the EU may be more concerned about any process that upsets [打翻▶MAKE SOMETHING FALL◀  to push something over without intending to ] its own delicate institutional[2institutional attitudes and behaviour have existed for a long time in an organization and have become accepted as normal even though they are bad ] balance, to say nothing of making it harder to gain a consensus for a new EU constitution. Having put the brakes on further external enlargement, the EU will not welcome a form of internally-generated expansion.

A hard look at the position of all the regions discussed above, suggest that even if some grievances have a historical basis, under present circumstances they enjoy considerable privileges. Although it is always possible that one successful secessionist [someone who wants their country or state to be independent of another country ] attempt in coming years might trigger a "demonstration affect" spurring others, these movements, on their own, still lack the political momentum or popular [done by a lot of people in a society, group etc] legitimacy to realise their ambitions in the foreseeable future.